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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1962

MUNICIPAL FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
IN NEBRASKA
The city of Omaha recently enacted an ordinance regulating
fair employment practices.' By the ordinance, employers, employment agencies and labor organizations are prohibited from discriminating against employees, job applicants or members on the
basis of race, color, creed or national origin.2 The ordinance was
the center of much controversy; the assistant city attorney stated
the ordinance 3 and the city's
that the city lacked the power to enact
4
law.
the
opposed
newspaper
leading
I. F.E.P. AROUND THE NATION
Twenty states 5 and over thirty-five cities 6 currently have Fair
Employment Practices legislation. The earliest enactment was
in New York in 1945. 7 Despite the relatively large number of enactments,8 there have been few cases testing the constitutionality
of F.E.P.

I Omaha, Neb. Municipal Code c. 14.04 (1962).
2
3

4

Ibid.
Opinion of F. A. Brown, Assistant City Attorney, Jan. 31, 1962 (on file
at the Nebraska Law Review). For the purpose of this comment, it is

assumed that the ordinance has been carefully drafted to avoid problems of ambiguity, and further that it is internally sound and enacted
in accordance with the procedure of the Omaha Charter.
Omaha World Herald, Editorial, Feb. 8, 1962.

LAws ANN. § 43-5-1 (1958); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1410;
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-19-1 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31122 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. § 19-170 (Supp. 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. C.
48, § 851 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2307 (Supp.
1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 44, § 1001 (Supp. 1959); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. c. 151b, § 1 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458 (Rev. 1960);
Micn. STAT. ANN. § 17.458 (Rev. 1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01
(1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-12 (Supp. 1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 594-1 (1953); N.Y. ExECUTrIVE LAW c. 18, § 290; Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
659.010 (Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 951 (Supp. 1960); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-1 (1956); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (Supp.
1958); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31 (Supp. 1961).
6 Ferman, Discriminationin Employment, 6 N.Y.L.F. 59, 65 (1960). For
examples of specific city ordinances, see GRAVEs, FAIR EMPLOYMENT
5

ALASKA COMP.

PRACTICE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 204-14 (1951).
7 GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 192 (1959).
s Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1955); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S.

88 (1945); City of Highland Park v. Fair Employment Practices
Comm'n, 364 Mich. 508, 111 N.W.2d 797, 800 (1961).

COMMENTS
This is probably explained on the federal level by the Supreme
Court's decision in the Railway Mail case.9 There, a labor organization attacked the New York statute,' 0 on the grounds that it violated due process of law and impaired contract rights. These contentions were dismissed by the court as a distortion of the policy of
the fourteenth amendment which was adopted to prevent discrimination on the basis of race or color. 1 Although the applicability of
the statute to employers and employment agencies was not at issue,
this case is decisive of the general validity of F.E.P. under the
federal constitution.
The constitutionality of F.E.P. has been tested in only one
state.' 2 A city attacked the validity of the Michigan statute on the
ground of vagueness.' 3 The court found the act sufficiently clear
so as to provide due process of law.' 4
A variety of reasons have been offered to explain the lack
of attacks on F.E.P. in the state courts. Proponents of F.E.P. argue
that such legislation inspires a spirit of co-operation among em9 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Crosi, supra note 8.
10 N.Y. Executive Law, c. 18 § 290 (The act prohibited exclusion from

membership in a labor organization because of race, color, creed, etc.).
11 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Crosi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945).
12 City of Highland Park v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 364 Mich.
508, 111 N.W.2d 797, 799 (1961). There are cases that have questioned
the manner in which the act was applied. Draper v. Clark Dairy Inc., 17
Conn. Supp. 93 (1954); Halland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581
(1954) ; Ross v. Arbury, 206 Misc. 74, 133 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
13 McH. STAT.
14

Ai'x. § 17.458 (Rev. 1960).

City of Highland Park v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 364 Mich.
508, 111 N.W.2d 797, 799 (1961). While not considering the problem of
vagueness in the paper, it may be worthwhile to compare the Michigan
statute with the Omaha ordinance. The Omaha ordinance provides:
(§ 14.04.030)
"It shall be an unfair employment practice:
1. For an employer, because of race, religion, creed, color, national
origin or ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to
bar or to discharge from employment such individual, or to discriminate
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
The Michigan statute provides: (§ 17.458)
"It shall be an unfair employment practice:
(A) For any employer, because of race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against him with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, or any other matter, directly or indirectly related to employment, except where based on a bona fide occupational
qualification.
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ployers, employees and agencies administering the laws, so that
they accept the rulings of the agencies and do not resort to the
courts.1 5 A contrary view suggests that there is little incentive to
contest the acts, since where resistance to F.E.P. is highest, i.e.,
professional, semi-professional and supervisory positions, evasion
is easiest; while in low level jobs, the demand for labor lowers
resistance and combines with the difficulty of evasion to deter a
16
court test.
Some statutes do not have enforcement provisions,17 which obviously means there would be no sanctions or court orders to appeal
from. A further factor deterring court tests may be the fear of
adverse publicity by those businesses which depend upon a minority group for part of their market. And, undoubtedly the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Railway Mail Ass'n v. Crosi's
has had some effect upon the attitudes of people at the state level.
Any one or more of these factors may operate to discourage a
court test of the Omaha ordinance, but since the city attorney has
advised against the act, 19 a test case may be in the offering.
II. F.E.P. IN NEBRASKA
Attempts to pass an F.E.P. act in the Nebraska Legislature have
been unsuccessful. 20 However, there is little doubt that a state
has the power to do this. 2 ' Particular authority for this viewpoint
is found in Messenger v. State.22 The court quashed an indictment
24
2
under the Nebraska public accommodation statute, 1 but stated:
15 Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1955).
16 Avins, Book Review, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1958).
17

Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957)

(Negro could not

compel union to admit him under state F.E.P. act, since there were no
enforcement provisions). This act has subsequently been amended to
provide enforcement. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.36 (Supp.
1961). The Omaha ordinance § 14.04.060 provides for either a $500 fine

or six months in jail or both for violations.
18 326 U.S. 88 (1945).

Opinion of F. A. Brown, Assistant City Attorney, Jan. 31, 1962, (on file
at the Nebraska Law Review).
2(1 Neb. Leg. Journal, 72d Sess. 1310 (1961); 69th Sess. 1429 (1959).
21 GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AmERICAN LAW 193 (1959).
22 25 Neb. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889) (barber refused to cut Negro's hair)
1I

(indictment quashed for insufficiency).
3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-101
24

(Supp. 1954).

Messenger v. State, 25 Neb. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889).
Generally such
statutes have been upheld. See Bob-ho Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333
U.S. 28 (1948). See also Annot., 49 A.L.R. 505 (1927).

COMMENTS
"There is no doubt of the authority of the state to prevent discrimination against certain individuals or races because of their color
or previous condition." Admittedly, this was dictum, but a reading of the case suggests that the court was laying down a caveat
that the statute was enforceable. Thus, if the state can regulate
discrimination in such things as hotels, trains and restaurants, then
they should be able to regulate discrimination in employment.
While a distinction can be drawn between places of public accommodation and employment, the distinction seems insignificant when
opposed to the power of the state.
It is conceivable that municipal F.E.P. might be regarded by
the Nebraska court as a violation of the equal protection of the law.
This argument has apparently not been raised before.25 The basic
issue would be whether the persons affected by the law constitute
a valid class. While this question is somewhat beyond the scope
of this comment, it is suggested that the ordinance appears to be
acceptable on this ground also.
III. VALIDITY OF ORDINANCES IN GENERAL
Even if legislation is constitutional on the state level, to be
valid on the municipal level it must survive three basic tests: (1)
the ordinance must not conflict with the state law, (2) the state
cannot have pre-empted the field, and (3) the city must have the
legislative power to enact the specific type of legislation. 20
A.

CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW

The balancing of interests between the state and the city raises
issues which are analogous to the state-federal constitutional problems' of powers reserved to the states, those held concurrently, and
those enumerated of the federal government. Thus, there will be
areas in which the city has exclusive jurisdiction, others where the
state will prevail, and still others where both city and state can act
concurrently.
In Nebraska, a home rule city will prevail where an ordinance
and state law conflict, if the conflict is over a matter of strictly local
concern.2 7 While the line between local and statewide concern is
not always clear, 28 the regulation of conditions of employment and
25

See text at notes 9 and 12 supra.

26

Axelrod, Home Rule, 30 NEB. L. REV. 224 (1951).
Id. at 225, 226, 234.

27
28

Id. at 234; Winter, Municipal Home Rule, A ProgramReport?, 36 NEB. L.
REV. 447, 459 (1957). The following have been held matters of local
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labor seems to be of statewide concern. So, if there is a conflict
between the Omaha ordinance and state law, the state law will
prevail. It appears, however, that the ordinance merely extends
the area covered by the existing statutes and does not conflict with
them. 2 9

B.

PRE-EMPTION BY THE STATE

The distinction between pre-emption by the state and conflict
with state law is sometimes more form than substance. It has
been said that pre-emption occurs when the state has intended to
occupy the field.30 When this happens, the ordinance must fail; but
the courts have not consistently applied the rule.3 '
The Nebraska Legislature has legislated extensively in the field
of labor, and there is strong evidence of an intent to occupy the
field. 32 But, the legislature has specifically refused to legislate on
discrimination in labor except in a very limited area. 33 This raises
the question of whether legislative silence should be construed as
an intent to occupy the field.
There is dicta in the case of Consumer's Coal Co. v. City of

Lincoln,34 to the effect that the city can act so long as the state has
concern: paving of streets, Sandell v. City of Omaha, 115 Neb. 861, 215
N.W. 135 (1937); imposition of city taxes, Eppley Hotels v. City of
Lincoln, 133 Neb. 550, 276 N.W. 196 (1937); extensions of water mains
and assessments therefore, Pester v. City of Grand Island, 127 Neb. 440,
225 N.W. 923 (1934); issuance of bonds to finance a municipal airport,
State ex rel. Lincoln v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N.W. 273 (1928).
Matters of statewide concern were: eminent domain, Nagle v. City of
Grand Island, 144 Neb. 67, 12 N.W.2d 540 (1943); fireman's pensions,
Oxberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942); regulation
of surface transportation systems, Omaha and C.B. St. Ry. v. City of
Omaha, 125 Neb. 825, 252 N.W. 407 (1934). Matters of mutual concern:
gambling, State ex. rel. Hunter v. Araho, 137 Neb. 389, 289 N.W. 545
(1940); alcoholic beverages, Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb. 535, 272 N.W. 547
(1937).
-:" NEB.

REV. STAT. § 20-101 (Supp. 1960) (prohibits discrimination in
places of public accommodation); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-214 (Supp. 1960)
(racial discrimination by collective bargaining agents prohibited); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-215 (Supp. 1960) (racial discrimination by firms producing or distributing military and naval supplies is prohibited).

31 Axelrod, Home Rule, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 224, 225 (1951)

(Emphasis added).

11Ibid.
:12 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-101-912 (Supp. 1960). See note 29 supra.

d1

NEB. LEG. JOURNAL, 72d Sess. 1310 (1961), 69th Sess. 1429 (1959); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-214-15 (Supp. 1960). See note 29 supra.
"It [the city] may provide for the exercise of power on subjects, connected with municipal concerns, which are also proper for state legisla-

COMMENTS
not; but it is doubtful how far the court will apply this concept. 35
states that legislative silence
And, there is authority in the other
36
may be construed as pre-emption.
If the Nebraska court should follow this line of cases, it will
force the city into a cul de sac, where the city cannot act while the
state will not. It is suggested that this approach violates the basic
philosophy of home rule and should not be followed.
C.

MUNIcIPAL LEGISLATIVE POWER

If the ordinance survives these first two tests, the problem remains whether the city has the power to enact the ordinance. Generally, municipal legislative power is derived from the state constitution and statutes.3 7 In determining the scope of this power,
Dillon's Rule is applied to the statutory or constitutional grant. By
this Rule, the city's legislative power is limited to those powers
expressly granted, necessarily or fairly implied, or38essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the municipality.
Theoretically, home rule frees the city from the narrow re-

35
30

37

38

tion, but upon which the state has not spoken, until it speaks." Consumer's Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 59, 189 N.W. 643, 646 (1922)
(dictum).
Winter, Municipal Home Rule, A Progress Report?, 36 NEB. L. REV. 447,
458 (1957).
Stephenson v. City of Palm Springs, 52 Cal. 2d 407, 340 P.2d 1009 (1959);
Chovez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. App. 2d 162, 329 P.2d 579 (1st Dist. 1958)
(municipal right to work ordinances held invalid because state had preempted the field, despite no specific statutes); City of Golden v. Ford,
141 Colo. 472, 348 P.2d 951, 953 (1960) quoting with approval Wilson v.
Beville 47 Cal. 2d 852, 306 P.2d 789 (1957) "[I]ts intent with regard
to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local regulations is not to
be measured alone by the language used, but by the whole purpose and
scope of the legislative scheme."
The problem of silence and pre-emption exists on the state-federal
level. A recent decision of questionable merit held that the Colorado
F.E.P. statute was not applicable to a common carrier in interstate commerce because of pre-emption by the federal government. Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 368 P.2d 970
(Colo. 1962). The majority opinion overlooks the fact that the Railway
Mail case, see text at notes 9, 10, 11 supra, held the New York law enforceable on a union working on a common carrier in interstate commerce. Further, the authorities cited by the majority were cases holding
state laws which demanded segregation in interstate commerce unenforceable because of the fourteenth amendment.
ANTiEAU, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATION LAW §§ 2.00-2.14, 3.00-3.36 (Supp.
1961); 2 McQumLAN, MUcnCIPL CORPOArTIONS § 10.09 (Supp. 1961).
2 McQUILAN, MUNICIPAL CoRorAIONS § 10.09 (Supp. 1961).
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straints of Dillon's Rule and the control of the state legislature.3 9
Unfortunately, in Nebraska, the theory has seldom been put into
practice.
The Nebraska Constitution provides for home rule, 40 and in
the leading Nebraska case, Consumer's Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln,41
the court held that a home rule charter could be construed as either
a grant or limitation of power. 42 By so doing, the court effectively
emasculated home rule, since in the same opinion it stated that
when a charter was construed as a grant of power, then the narrow
restraints of Dillon's Rule would apply to the charter fo determine
the scope of the city's legislative power. 43 Of course, if the charter
was a limitation of power, then the city would have all powers except those specifically prohibited. 44 However, no Nebraska case
has been found in which the court has construed a charter as a limitation of power.
In the Consumer's Coal case, Lincoln passed an ordinance creating a municipal coal and wood yard in competition with private
concerns. In holding the charter a grant of power, the court was
apparently influenced by the following factors: the home rule charter was only a copy of the state legislative charter, 45 and the
charter specified subjects upon which the city council could legislate. 46 Since the charter "defined" rather than "limited" the powers
47
of the city, it could only be a grant of power and not a limitation.
Subsequent cases have added nothing but confusion to this explanation of what constituted a grant of power. A recent decision
indicated that home rule charters are grants of power per se.4 8 This
would suggest that the holding in the Consumer's Coal case 49 that
a charter might only be a limitation of power, is no longer the law.
39 Winter, Muncipal Home Rule, A Progress Report?, 36 NEB. L. REV. 447,

450, 451 (1957).
40 NEB.

CONST. art XI,

§ 5.

42

109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922).
Id. at 66, 189 N.W. at 649.

43

Id. at 64-69, 189 N.W. at 649-50. This point was reaffirmed, Standard Oil

44

Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 248, 207 N.W. 172, 174 (1926).
Ibid.

41

45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 55, 189 N.W. at 645.
Id. at 68, 189 N.W. at 649.
Id. at 68, 69, 189 N.W. 649, 650.
Philson v. City of Omaha, 167 Neb. 360, 362, 93 N.W.2d 13, 15 (1952).
Consumer's Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643
(1922).

COMMENTS
However, it seems that the court merely overstated its position,
for the authority it relied on merely held that the 1922 Omaha
Charter was a grant of power, 50 and further, the court in that instance was relying on the Consumer's Coal case and Fallsdorf v.
Grand Island.51 The holding in these cases was that the specific
charters under consideration were grants of power. 52 Apparently
then, Consumer's Coal is still the leading Nebraska case.
IV. OMAHA'S CHARTER-GRANT OR LIMITATION
With the above analysis in mind, it should be noted that the
present Omaha Charter 53 was adopted pursuant to the home rule
provision of the constitution,5 4 and is a substantial change from
the previous charter, which was a copy of the former legislative
charter. Section 1.03 provides: 55
The city shall have all powers of local self government and
home rule and all other powers that it is possible for it to have at
the present and in the future under the constitution of the State of
Nebraska. The city shall also have all powers that now are, or
hereafter may be granted by the laws of the State of Nebraska.
Except for powers expressly denied it by the charter, the city shall
also have all powers granted or claimed by it in the Home Rule
Charter of 1922, as amended, but the city shall not be limited to
these powers. All powers shall be exercised in the manner prescribed herein, in such manner as shall be provided by ordinance.
Since the court suggests in the Consumer's Coal case that the most
power a city could have would be under a charter which was a limitation of power, 56 and since the present Omaha Charter allocates
all possible powers to the city, it would follow that this charter is
a limitation of power.
However, the past decisions of the court indicate a predisposition towards construing charters as grants of power. 57 While the
1956 Omaha Charter does not make the mistake of "defining" powers in terms of police, health or general welfare, it does set out in
broad categories the various duties of specific divisions of govern50 Wagner v. City of Omaha, 156 Neb. 163, 166, 55 N.W.2d 490, 493 (1952).

51 138 Neb. 212, 292 N.W. 498 (1940).
52 Id. at 219, 292 N.W. at 602; Consumer's Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109
Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922).
53 Omaha, Neb. Municipal Charter of 1956 § 1.03 (Emphasis added).

54 Neb. Const. art XI, § 5.
55 Omaha, Neb. Municipal Charter of 1956, § 1.03.
56 Consumer's Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 68-69, 189 N.W. 643,
649, 650 (1922).
57

See text at notes 49-53 supra.
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ment,58 and little more than this was necessary in the Consumer's
Coal case for the court to hold Lincoln's charter a grant of power. 59
It is suggested that the intent manifested by Section 1.03 of the
Omaha Charter 60 should be implemented and the charter construed
as a limitation of power. The language of the charter seems to require this and the Consumer's Coal case seems to permit it. Furthermore, the distinction between a grant and limitation of power
has only served to allow the court to espouse the philosophy of
home rule, while denying its practice in Nebraska, except in very
narrow confines.
If the court should construe the charter as a limitation of power,
it would follow that since there is no specific prohibition against
F.E.P., then the ordinance is valid.
But, if in spite of the apparent intention of the framers of
the charter, the court should construe the charter as a grant of
power, then under the rule of the Consumer's Coal case,0 1 it would
be necessary to apply Dillon's Rule to the charter to determine if
62
the ordinance was within the scope of the city's power.
First, is the power expressly granted? Obviously, the charter does not specifically state that the city can regulate fair employment practices.6 3 By the same token, the charter does not grant
any specific power to the city. Thus the express grant of Section
1.03 is either so broad that it includes the power to legislate in the
area, or all powers of the city must be determined by the second
part of Dillon's Rule, i.e., is the power fairly or necessarily implied.
Certainly Section 1.03 is broad enough to imply about anything,
but in addition Section 4.04 states that the Human Relation Board
shall: 64
(1) Advise the Mayor and Council on all matters concerning
the administration and enforcement of laws and ordinances prohibiting discrimination against persons because of race or political
or religious opinions or affiliations.
It must be fairly implied that this section presupposes the existence
of F.E.P. type ordinances and logically the existence of the ordi58

Omaha, Neb. Municipal Charter of 1956, art. II, council; art. III, executive; art. IV, boards, commissions and authorities; art. V, finances; art.
VI, personnel; art. VII, planning; art. VIII, miscellaneous.

59 See text at note 47 supra.
60 See text at note 56 supra.
G1 See text at note 43 supra.
62

See text of Dillon's Rule at note 38 supra.

63 Omaha, Neb. Municipal Charter of 1956, § 1.03.
64

Id.

§ 4.04.

COMMENTS
nances implies the power to pass such ordinances. On this ground
alone, the ordinance should be valid.
But, perhaps additional support for the ordinance may be found
under the third part of Dillon's Rule: Is the ordinance essential to
the declared objects and purposes of the city? The well being of
its citizenry is generally acknowledged as an object and purpose of
government, and should be recognized as such, for the city of
Omaha. And while this paper will not attempt to argue pro or con
regarding the sociological aspects of racial discrimination in employment, it is suggested that F.E.P. will have beneficial effects in
welfare of minority groups and through them will benefit the city
as a whole. Thus, the ordinance may be valid under the third section of Dillon's Rule also.
V. CONCLUSION
F.E.P. has been held constitutional by those courts that have
considered it, and the Messenger case 65 suggests that it would be
valid in Nebraska. There is no conflict between F.E.P. and existing
statutes; and to say that the state has pre-empted the field by refusing to act, will merely subvert the concept of home rule and
prevent Omaha from trying to solve one of its problems. Finally,
whether the Omaha charter is a grant or limitation of power, it is
suggested that the city has the power to enact such legislation.
Denis G. Stack, '63

65 See text at note 22 supra.

